Congo, Forgotten
The Numbers Behind Africa’s Longest Humanitarian Crisis
The Congo Research Group (CRG) is an independent, non-profit research project dedicated to understanding the violence that affects millions of Congolese. We carry out rigorous research on different aspects of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. All of our research is informed by deep historical and social knowledge of the problem at hand. We are based at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University.

All of our publications, blogs and podcasts are available at: www.congoresearchgroup.org and www.gecongo.org

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The Kivu Security Tracker is a joint project of Human Rights Watch and the Congo Research Group at New York University.

Conflict continues to affect the lives of millions in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. According to a variety of humanitarian measures, overall conditions in the country have not improved much in recent years.1 Last year, 1.8 million people were newly displaced by violence, more than anywhere else in the world except Ethiopia, and an estimated 12.8 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance and protection in 2019, 10 percent of the total worldwide humanitarian caseload.2 And yet, the country receives comparatively little media coverage. In 2018, Congo’s conflict was mentioned four times on the front page of the New York Times, compared with 61 times for the Syrian conflict.3

Part of the challenge is the sheer complexity of the conflict. According to our latest mapping (see Annex A), there are currently over 130 armed groups in just North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, fighting for countless reasons. That is an increase from 70 in 2015 and 120 in 2017.4 With such an abundance of armed actors and without a simple narrative, it is easier for many to just look away. Even for those decision makers in the Congolese government, the United Nations, and various donor partners who have spent billions of dollars in recent years in attempting to end the violence, it is often difficult to decide which areas and issues to prioritize.

The Kivu Security Tracker (KST) is an attempt to address these twin challenges – the lack of attention and the difficulties in identifying priorities – by distilling the violence – clashes between fighters and abuses against civilians – through clear graphic maps of incidents and actors to better understand where the violence is worst, what its causes are, and how to end abuses. The aim is to provide critical information to the Congolese public and government, as well as to the many foreign agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and donors working in the region.
We work in the two of the most conflict-affected provinces, North and South Kivu, with a team of 15 dedicated Congolese researchers based across this area. Every day, they speak with customary chiefs, clergy, civil society activists, and government officials to document the worst violence and seek to identify the armed groups responsible. Project staff in Congo and abroad make sure the information is reliable and then plot it in an online, interactive map that shows where armed groups are active, where the worst violence has occurred, and who is allegedly responsible.

Our full methodology, including the definition of these categories and how we gather and triangulate our data, can be found in on our website. The KST’s approach of training networks of local researchers, who then report and verify violent incidents, is also being used in other conflict zones. The Yemen Data Project, founded in 2016, as well as various organizations in Syria (the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, in particular) have similar approaches, and their data has contributed significantly to the understanding of conflicts in those countries.

The need for this kind of disaggregated data in Congo has become particularly acute in recent years. In late 2017, the UN Office for Humanitarian Coordination (OCHA) suspended the publication of national totals of internally displaced people, one of the best measures for conflict levels, due to pressure from the government. And while the UN Joint Human Rights Office publishes data on human rights violations, their reporting at the provincial level does not provide details beyond how many violations are committed per province, broken down only by non-state and state actors.

A different approach to sourcing information

Our approach invests significant resources into uncovering and verifying violence – incidents of fighting and abuses – at the local level. This differs substantially from other datasets of violence in conflict. Until recently, the largest such datasets – Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCD/PRIO), Correlates of War (CoW), and Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset (ACLED) – mainly sourced violence from local and international media reports. This created a problem of underreporting violence, as much of the violence happens a long way from these correspondents and may not be deemed newsworthy. In addition, these media do not have the means to triangulate or confirm violence, and are therefore more prone to misreporting incidents. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) compiles statistics on crime rates (which is different from civilians affected by conflict) and sources its data largely from governments.

This difference can be seen clearly in the data. During the period from June 2017 to December 2017, the KST documented more than three times as many fatalities than ACLED, or 610 compared with 177. Tellingly, UNODC has no data for homicides in Congo.
General trends in the conflict in the Kivus

Between June 1, 2017 and June 26, 2019, the KST documented 3,015 incidents of fighting and abuses with 6,555 victims in the following categories:

- Violent death: 1,041 incidents with 1,897 victims
- Mass rape: 24 incidents with 100 victims
- Abduction/kidnap for ransom: 848 incidents with 3,316 victims
- Destruction of property: 148 incidents
- Political repression: 106 incidents
- Clash: 1,290 incidents

This data, taken together with the most reliable available population statistics, indicates that 8.38 civilians were killed per 100,000 people in the Kivus in 2018.\(^{10}\) To put this in perspective, Nigeria’s Borno state – the state most affected by Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in West Africa – had a death rate of 6.87 per 100,000, according to the Council on Foreign Relations: Nigeria Tracker. The comparable rate for all of Yemen was 4.13 last year, based on documentation by the Yemen Data Project.\(^{11}\) While these numbers fluctuate based on the area used for comparison, it is clear that eastern Congo continues to see levels of violence as high as some of the other most violent places in the world.

While there have been sharp variations in the numbers of abuses documented by the KST over time, the average number of verified incidents per month is around 120. There was a peak in violations in the last three months of 2017, driven by a surge in attacks linked to further delays in elections – the Coalition nationale pour la souveraineté du Congo (CNPSC) coalition in South Kivu, for example, launched a large offensive during this time – as well as an escalation in fighting in Beni territory.

In general, armed violence is concentrated in the densely populated highlands in the far east of the Kivu provinces, close to the Ugandan, Rwandan, and Burundian borders. One can draw a line between Eringeti town in the far north of North Kivu and Baraka in the far south of South Kivu that encompasses a large majority of all violence in the two provinces.

While all Congolese armed groups are based in rural areas, cities have become increasingly dangerous in recent years, as criminal gangs – often linked to armed groups – have intensified their attacks. Nine percent of killings, for example, took place in the towns of Goma, Butembo, and Bukavu alone.
Violence in the Kivus does not necessarily occur in remote areas. Forty-five percent of the killings took place within one kilometer of a major road, and are highly correlated with population density. This suggests that the Congolese army has not secured the most important thoroughfares, posing a serious obstacle for trade and travel in the region. The most important roads in the region, the Route nationale #2 and #5, linking Beni-Butembo-Goma-Bukavu-Uvira-Baraka are so dangerous – as well as in poor physical condition – that many prefer to travel by airplane, boat, or not at all.
Where is violence the worst?

The epicenter of violence in the Kivus is Beni territory: 31 percent of all killings of civilians took place here, driven largely by fighting between the Congolese security forces and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebellion. This Ugandan armed group has killed at least 272 civilians. The number of victims of ADF attacks is likely to be much higher, including many of the 223 victims of attacks that are currently listed as unattributed, as there are no other armed groups with active bases to the north and east of Beni town. As several Congo Research Group (CRG) reports suggest, army operations in this area that began in 2014 triggered a spate of massacres, involving several armed groups, as local power balances were disrupted.

Despite its notoriety, the ADF is not the only armed group in this area that engaged in fighting with the Congolese government. The Mai-Mai Mazembe, a cluster of militias that recruit within the Nande community to the west and south of Lake Edward, were the armed group that clashed the most with the army during this period. The Congolese army launched a large offensive against this armed group in 2017, triggering months of protracted fighting.

Other hotspots of violence include Rutshuru territory, where 35 percent of all kidnappings took place. As the mapping shows, many of these incidents happened along the busy Goma-Rutshuru town road, as well as in the outskirts of Rutshuru town. This area hosts several Congolese and Rwandan armed groups, as well as criminal gangs, that use the Virunga National Park as a rear base. Further to the north, in the area where the territories of Rutshuru, Walikale, Masisi, and Lubero meet, there has been an uptick in violence since the Congolese army launched operations against the Rwandan Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) rebels in early 2015. The Congolese army allied with local militias (Nduma Defense of Congo-Renové, or NDC-R, and Mai-Mai Mazembe) that recruit from the Nande, Nyanga, and Kobo communities, while the FDLR drew on support from the mostly Hutu Nyatura groups.

![Map showing civilian casualties in North & South Kivu, DRC](image)
Finally, the highlands of Fizi and Uvira territories in the southern tip of South Kivu have constituted another flashpoint — 11 percent of killings and 17 percent of clashes have taken place here. Two interlocking conflicts are responsible for most of this violence. First, a variety of armed groups made up largely, but not exclusively, of members of the Bembe community forged the Coalition Nationale pour la Souveraineté du Congo (CNPSC) in 2017, launching a battery of attacks against the army as elections were delayed yet again, reaching the outskirts of Uvira town in September 2017. Then, since early 2018, ethnic rivalries between the Banyamulenge and the Bafuliro communities in the highlands have been exacerbated by regional dynamics. Burundian RED-Tabara, FNL and FOREBU rebels, some backed by the Rwandan government, have been fighting against Rwandan rebels and Congolese Mai-Mai groups, some of whom in turn have received some support from the Congolese and Burundian governments.
Interrogating specific aspects of the conflict

Violence and natural resources

On the face of it, natural resources would seem to be a significant part of the problem in eastern Congo. Advocacy groups have often focused on the mining of tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold as a source of revenue for armed groups, largely through taxation of mining pits and trade routes.\(^1\)

The data from the KST, however, shows that there is no systematic correlation between violence and mining areas. Only 20 percent of violent incidents occur within 20 kilometers of a mine, and only 3 percent occur within 2 kilometers. There are indeed some clusters of violence around some mining areas, for example around gold mining sites in northern Shabunda, or the Misisi gold mines of southern Fizi. However, some of the epicenters of violence are in areas with no mines: the vicinity of Beni town, for example, all of Rutshuru territory, and the Ruzizi Plain.

This does not mean that mining does not have an impact on violence. In some cases, violence has been directly associated with battles for control of mining areas. There is also ample evidence that armed groups focus much of their attention on taxing mining sites and mineral trade routes. Artisanal mining sites also offer an important source of patronage for Congolese army commanders. For a cash-strapped army, the ability to deploy units to lucrative mining sites provides commanders with an important source of revenue and power. This, in turn, has diminished their appetite to bring an end to the fighting and return to the barracks.

However, armed groups derive revenues from many sources, including charcoal production, poaching, kidnapping, and the taxation of all types of commodities and movement. While some groups are closely linked to mining areas, many others occupy terrain with no mining sites at all. It is also worth noting that there is little evidence that, historically, the major bouts of conflict escalation in the region – the *Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo* (AFDL) war (1996-1997), the *Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie* (RCD) war (1998-2003), and the *Congrès national pour la défense du people* (CNDP) and *Mouvement du 23 mars* (M23) wars (2006-2009 and 2012-2013) – were directly triggered by minerals.
Congoese army and UN peacekeeper casualties

The image of the Congolese army as a corrupt and ineffective force is deceptive. It is all too easy to personalize these traits, suggesting that they are inherent characteristics of the soldiers and not the product of the circumstances in which they function. In fact, soldiers are paid very little and irregularly, receive paltry medical treatment, and the families’ living conditions are often extremely squalid.

Despite this, Congolese army troops regularly risk their lives in military operations. The government does not publish comprehensive casualty figures. The KST focal points, however, often obtain information about the number of soldiers killed during operations – 723 over the past two years alone. While this is surely far from a comprehensive figure, it provides a basic understanding of the deadliest areas for the Congolese army’s deployments. While many of the army’s 346 clashes happened in operations against the ADF (77) and other armed groups around Beni, the armed group with which it clashed the most was the Mai-Mai Mazembe (101).

The UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, has also suffered significant casualties in recent years. Of the 73 peacekeepers killed in Congo since the beginning of the mission, then known as MONUC, in 1999, 38 percent have been killed since 2015, all in Beni territory.

MONUSCO’s offensive operations often take place in collaboration with the Congolese army. It is not surprising, therefore, to see that the same armed groups posed the gravest threat to both militaries. MONUSCO’s clashes were mostly with three armed groups based in Beni and Lubero territory: the Mai-Mai Mazembe, the ADF, and the NDC-R.
FARDC casualties
North & South Kivu, DRC
Heat map that shows FARDC casualties during clashes by death count
Total Death count of FARDC soldiers from clashes 723

Civilian casualties
North Kivu, DRC
Heat map that shows civilian casualties by death count
CDs = Civilian deaths

Top perpetrators
Beni and Butembo
Unknown: 230 CDs
ADF: 228 CDs
FARDC: 49 CDs

Rutshuru
Unknown: 78 CDs
FARDC: 44 CDs
Nyatura Love: 41 CDs
Mazembe: 38 CDs

Goma and Nyiragongo
Unknown: 129 CDs
PNC (Police): 8 CDs
FARDC: 2 CDs
Implications for peacekeeping efforts

It would be easy to see these dots on a map and think that conflicts were mere military engagements between belligerents vying over turf and resources. This is not the case: armed actors in eastern Congo are deeply shaped by their social and political realities. As Congo Research Group has discussed elsewhere, various factors have contributed to the persistence of conflict:

- **The dramatic proliferation of armed groups** in recent years has made it more difficult to reach a settlement as the number of actors and potential spoilers increase, an issue complicated by the nature of the disputes, which are often waged over problems such as land and the control of lucrative trade.

- **Over two decades of conflict has created a military bourgeoisie**—people within economic, political, and security elites who have used conflict to advance their careers and who have a vested interest in the persistence of violence.

- **The Congolese government**—noticeably absent on our map of armed groups—is probably the most important actor in the conflict. It has shown little interest in ending peripheral wars that do not threaten its survival. Instead, it has privileged maintaining patronage networks—some of which incorporate other armed groups—over the security of its citizens, and elite survival over institutional reform.

- Local drivers of violence, such as struggles over land and customary power, are important, but should be contextualized; over time, most armed groups have become increasingly integrated into elite networks.

- **Donors and the UN peacekeeping mission** have been unable to substantially transform these conflict dynamics and promote a lasting peace, often because the changes needed are deemed too risky, or too politically or financially difficult.

The statistics laid out here contribute to this analysis. While Beni remains the focus of armed violence, the conflict is spread across eastern Congo and involves scores of actors. The fighting in recent years shows that peace and stability in eastern Congo are elusive. Given that the Congolese state is one of the largest perpetrators of abuses against civilians and itself supports some armed groups, there will have to be deep-rooted reform at every level.

On his first trip as president to the Kivus in April 2019, President Felix Tshisekedi promised to redeploy troops that have been in the Kivus for a long time, to hold accountable anybody backing armed groups, and to reenergize military operations against armed groups. Despite these statements, the Congolese public is yet to see a detailed vision or strategy for stabilizing the Kivus, either from Tshisekedi or the UN peacekeeping mission, which is currently undergoing a strategic review. While several armed groups have surrendered or mentioned the intention to do so since Tshisekedi’s inauguration, there is currently no functional demobilization program for these 2,000 to 3,000 combatants. Meanwhile, there have been no new prosecutions of FARDC commanders for their abuses or support to armed groups, despite entreaties by human rights groups. Recent and ongoing prosecutions of a few armed group commanders have faced numerous challenges, including around witness and victim protection, the quality of investigations, and the rights of the accused.

It is clear that systemic reforms will take time and considerable political will from a Congolese government that is trying to balance its citizens’ huge expectations with internal tensions between its various factions. To reduce atrocities, President Tshisekedi will need to adopt a broad-based approach, including a reform of the Congolese security forces with a vetting process to remove those responsible for serious abuses, and an invigorated demobilization program with a long-term strategy for reintegration of former combatants. The country’s leadership will need to address calls from local communities for reconciliation, justice, and economic development. Tshisekedi himself has made clear that it is difficult
to envision lasting peace in the region without a concerted push for accountability. As Human Rights Watch has argued, the government could set up specialized mixed chambers or a specialized war crimes unit within the Congolese judiciary, focused specifically on prosecuting international crimes.

The international community, for its part, has been stymied in efforts to promote wholesale reform of the security sector and the administrative apparatus. Its initial stabilization program, under the heading of the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSS) (2009-2012), fell short in its ambitions, largely because its interests were not aligned with those of local actors and leaders. Since then, the second phase of the ISSS has focused on transforming local conflict dynamics, promoting accountability and reconciliation without trying to fundamentally reform national institutions. Other major donors have directed their attention on rendering the artisanal mining industry accountable, and in boosting the private sector more generally, in the hope that this will mitigate conflict dynamics. For example, the United States government through US Agency for International Development only allocated 0.8 percent of its 2013 budget in Congo to peace and stability, while the United Kingdom allotted 9 percent of its 2018/2019 budget to governance and security.

There has not been a comprehensive strategy to deal with armed conflict in the Kivus by foreign donors. MONUSCO has often been blocked by the government from facilitating peace talks between armed groups and the authorities and has been largely reduced to participating in military operations and using its diplomatic leverage to pressure various actors.

President Tshisekedi’s new administration in Kinshasa provides a welcome opportunity for the Congolese government and its foreign and local partners to mark a clear break with the past and implement the systemic, institutional reforms needed to address the drivers of violence, end the proliferation of armed groups, and hold those responsible for the worst abuses to account.
Annex A

Armed Actors in North and South Kivu
### North Kivu

**Active Groups**
- Allied Democratic Forces
- Raia Mutomboki Ndusha
- Mai-Mai Malaika-She Assani
- Raia Mutomboki Mungoro
- Mai-Mai Kirikicho
- Local Defense Ngengwe
- Mai-Mai Kifuafua Maachano
- Mai-Mai Kifuafua Delphin
- Nyatura Kigingi
- Mai-Mai Kifuafua Maachano
- Raia Mutomboki Habikuangaliye
- Mai-Mai Kifuafua Blangwe
- Mai-Mai Kyandenga
- Ex-M23 Busumba group
- Mai-Mai Muhima
- Nyatura Jean-Marie
- Raia Mutomboki Kazimoto (ex-Kiluni)
- Nyatura Bizagwira
- Raia Mutomboki Butachibera
- Raia Mutomboki Mabala
- Nyatura Domi
- Raia Mutomboki Shukuru
- Raia Mutomboki Mungoro
- Raia Mutomboki Shekula
- Raia Mutomboki Mihali Manyilisa
- Raia Mutomboki Mabala
- Raia Mutomboki Vunja Vikwazo
- Raia Mutomboki Safari
- Raia Mutomboki Ndumiso
- Raia Mutomboki Mungoro
- Raia Mutomboki Mihali Manyilisa
- Raia Mutomboki Mabala
- Raia Mutomboki Vunja Vikwazo

**Inactive Groups**
- Forces d'assistance militaire des Nations Unies (UNF) au Congo-Kinshasa
- Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda
- Nyatura Force de défense du peuple
- Former Mouvement 23 Mars
- Mai-Mai Charles
- Mai-Mai Mwemba
- Mai-Mai Mazembe
- Nduma Defense du Congo-Rénové
- Nyatura Delta
- Nyatura Domi
- Nyatura Kavyembu
- Raia Mutomboki Kisekelwa
- Raia Mutomboki Mihali Manyilisa
- Raia Mutomboki Mabala
- Raia Mutomboki Vunja Vikwazo
- Raia Mutomboki Safari
- Raia Mutomboki Ndumiso
- Raia Mutomboki Mungoro
- Raia Mutomboki Mihali Manyilisa
- Raia Mutomboki Mabala
- Raia Mutomboki Vunja Vikwazo

**Unmapped Groups**
- Raia Mutomboki Kabido/Front Populaire pour la Paix
- Mai-Mai kabida - APP/C/PPAP
- Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-
  Ralliement pour l'Unité et la Démocratie
- Raia Mutomboki Kabido/Front Populaire pour la Paix
- Mai-Mai kabida - APP/C/PPAP

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### South Kivu

**Active Groups**
- Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie
- Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda
- Nyatura Force de défense du peuple
- Former Mouvement 23 Mars
- Mai-Mai Charles
- Mai-Mai Mwemba
- Mai-Mai Mazembe
- Nduma Defense du Congo-Rénové
- Nyatura Delta
- Nyatura Domi
- Nyatura Kavyembu
- Raia Mutomboki Kisekelwa
- Raia Mutomboki Mihali Manyilisa
- Raia Mutomboki Mabala
- Raia Mutomboki Vunja Vikwazo

**Inactive Groups**
- Forces nationales de liberation-Nzabampema
- Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-
  Ralliement pour l'Unité et la Démocratie
- Raia Mutomboki Kabido/Front Populaire pour la Paix
- Mai-Mai kabida - APP/C/PPAP
- Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-
  Ralliement pour l'Unité et la Démocratie
- Raia Mutomboki Kabido/Front Populaire pour la Paix
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* Skipped numbers in sequence represent state actors and armed groups with insufficient data to determine proper areas of control.
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Endnotes


3. We searched mentions of ‘Congo’ and ‘Syria’ in the headline or first paragraph of the first page of The New York Times between January 1, 2018 and December 31, 2018. We also searched for all mentions of ‘Congo’ and ‘Syria’ on the first page in general to make sure we did not miss any article, discounting those that mentioned the countries tangentially but were not focused on them. Of the mentions of Congo, one was for the Ebola epidemic, one for the elections, one for the links of the ADF rebellion to ISIS, and one for the Nobel prize winner Denis Mukwege.


8. From December 2017 onwards, ACLED began including the KST as a source, making comparison more difficult.


10. If you take the 914 killings of civilians in the Kivus in 2018 and compare it to the population of the Kivu’s – 10.9 million according to Congolese National Institute of Statistics – you get a death rate of 8.38 per 100,000 civilians.

11. Civilians death in Borno state were 403 according to the Nigeria Security Tracker, the population of 5,860,183 for Borno is based on a 2016 estimate by the National Population Commission of Nigeria. The Yemen Data Project reported 1,186 civilian deaths in 2018.

12. Defined as primary, secondary or trunk roads by OpenStreetMap.


24 Exceptions have been the abortive peace talks between the government and the Nduma Defense of the Congo in 2017, for which MONUSCO provided logistics, and talks with the with the *Front de résistance patriotique en Ituri* (FRPI) in Ituri during the same period.
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